7 key takeaways from the Israeli military’s report on what happened on Oct. 7

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released most of its investigation of what happened on Oct. 7, 2023, and in the days leading up to Hamas’ massacre. While the initial investigation began in November 2023, outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi ordered all units to start probes in March 2024. The IDF refrained from offering recommendations in its report, saying that those would be left to incoming IDF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. (res.) Eyal Zamir, who will enter the role next week.

1. Oct. 7 in numbers

According to the IDF’s assessment, 5,000-5,600 militants infiltrated Israel in three waves. Meanwhile, 4,696 rockets and mortars were fired towards Israel. The attacks left 829 Israeli civilians, 76 foreign nationals and 415 security personnel dead. Additionally, 251 hostages were taken into the Gaza Strip.

'The fundamental failure was a result of failure to understand Hamas's intentions and readiness for a wide-scale surprise attack,' IDF senior officials say in the report.

2. Hamas attack timeline

Hamas’ attacks were not done hastily, according to the IDF, the planning began nearly seven years before the massacre, with the formation of the 'fundamental concept' in November 2016 and an 'initial plan' in July 2017. Hamas’ plan was approved in July 2019 and the operational plan was set in August 2021. In early 2022, a readiness committee was established and over the course of the year the terror group evaluated options for implementing its plan.

The IDF says Hamas considered numerous dates for the attacks, including Sept. 16, which was Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish new year, and Sept. 25, Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of atonement. Ultimately, Oct. 7, 2023, which coincided with the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah, which marks the end and re-start of the Torah.

3. Full timeline of Oct. 7

The attack, according to the IDF’s assessment began taking shape in the early hours of Oct. 7. Hamas allegedly began preparing its forces around 11:00 p.m. on Oct. 6, after spending much of the day putting them on alert and gathering weapons, and concluded briefings by 4:00 a.m. on Oct. 7. 

The infiltration itself began with the first wave at 6:29 a.m. when 1,154 members of Hamas’ Nukhba forces invaded, breaking the security barrier between Gaza and Israel. The IDF declared a state of emergency at 6:43 a.m., and at 7:10 a.m. the Israeli Air Force (IAF) followed suit.

Between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., 3,400 militants were inside Israeli territory. Additionally, just before 8:00 a.m., Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif called on civilians in Gaza to join the attacks. The assessment states that after 9:00 a.m. attackers took advantage of IDF failures and seized opportunities to further the assault. Some allegedly planned to go deeper into Israeli territory.

Several of the 'main attacks' were stopped by the IDF around 1:00 p.m., but there were still hundreds of attackers in Israel at 3:00 p.m. The IDF says it gained control of some of the communities and surrounding areas by 9:00 p.m., but dozens were present around midnight. 

'We did not predict Hamas would be able to be so brutal in its fighting,' IDF senior officials wrote.

4. IDF’s incorrect assessment of threats

Much of the IDF’s focus was on Iran and Hezbollah prior to the Oct. 7 attacks, and Hamas was defined as a secondary threat at the time. Additionally, the IDF assumed that it could contain Hamas activity as it worked toward 'gradually improving the existing reality' with the goal of removing the terror group. 

The IDF also believed that 'Hamas didn’t want a full-scale war,' leading Israel to conclude that a large-scale invasion was unlikely. In the assessment, the IDF says Hamas took advantage of Israel’s perception of the situation and used it to its advantage.

Another major misconception highlighted in the assessment is the IDF’s thinking that the main threat from Hamas were the rockets and mortars being shot from Gaza. This combined with reliance on defense tactics and a barrier, as well as the reduction of troops on the Israel-Gaza border would lead to catastrophe.

5. Intelligence failures

Israel’s Intelligence Directorate did not fully grasp or analyze intel it had on Hamas and its intentions. This apparently also applies to the IDF’s perception of the Shi’ite 'Axis' and its views on Israel. The IDF says that during the review it found deep-rooted systemic issues with the intelligence directorate and culture. 

Since 2018, the Intelligence Directorate had been gathering information on Hamas’ concept for a large-scale attack on Israel. However, the plan was deemed unfeasible and was thought to reflect Hamas’ long-term goals. 

In August 2021, intel on Hamas’ military wing described the plan for a large-scale attack on Israeli communities and military outposts surrounding the Gaza Strip. Intelligence officials failed to make the connection between this new intel and what it had gathered in 2018.

The intelligence received in the months leading up to Oct. 7 indicated that Hamas was carrying out training exercises for raids. This apparently changed Israel’s elite Unit 8200’s assessment of the situation, but this was allegedly not communicated with senior leadership.

6. 'Early signs' missed 

In the evening hours of Oct. 6, 2023, Israeli sim cards were activated inside Gaza. However, this was not alerted as it had happened before. Those same sim cards would later allow Hamas militants to communicate after they crossed the border into Israel. There were also indications that night that Hamas leaders were meeting. However, according to the IDF’s assessment, neither of these facts were enough to change the Intelligence Directorate’s way of thinking on Gaza, therefore there was no alert.
There were also indications of both usual and unusual Hamas activity that evening. The inquiry revealed that there were intelligence sources that could have been utilized overnight to enhance information that were not used. However, the IDF asserts that had the Intelligence Directive changed its assessment of the situation, there would have been a higher alert for a localized Hamas offensive, but not for an all-out war.

7. Assessment of the IAF

The IAF was found to have met and even exceeded the defined standards for readiness except for two instances due to heavy rocket fire. However, these standards did not align with what would have been required to prepare for a large-scale surprise attack. The IDF concluded that there was 'significant difficulty' distinguishing IDF troops, civilians and terrorists from one another.

While the IAF struck key Hamas command centers, the IDF admits that even in its review of the strikes it is challenging to determine if there could have been a more effective strike effort given the circumstances.

However, it was noted that the IDF did not prepare for anything like the brutal Oct. 7 massacre.
'We were addicted to the precise intelligence and information we got as commanders and did not consider other scenarios. This failure will forever be etched in our memories, and we will never and should never forget,' IDF senior officials wrote.

In its conclusion, the IDF notes that the assessment of the situation in Gaza and regarding Hamas was so entrenched in the establishment that there was no deep discussion about alternate possibilities. Additionally, it now says that it was 'incorrect' to try to 'conflict manage' Hamas and, in the future, the removal of threats should be prioritized.

The assessment also addresses the possibility of a future attack, saying that a preventative strategy will be key.